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Abstract
This Note examines the Court’s current construction of article 95. This construction involves
a fairly strict and straightforward application of article 95’s broad prohibition upon discriminatory
internal taxation by one member state against imports from another member state. The Court has
also created an exception to this broad prohibition. This Note will define this exception in the
context of cases reaching the Court by both procedural routes.
KEEPING UP THE NATION'S SPIRITS: AN EXCEPTION
TO THE BROAD PROHIBITION OF ARTICLE 95
OF THE TREATY OF ROME
INTRODUCTION
Article 95 of the Treaty establishing the European Eco-
nomic Community' (EEC Treaty or Treaty) is a broad prohibi-
tion against the imposition by the member states' of the Euro-
pean Economic Community3 (EEC) of internal taxes that dis-
1. Article 95's broad rule prohibits internal taxation by a member state which
discriminates in favor of that country's products, either as imports or exports.
No Member State shall impose, directly or indirectly, on the products of
other Member States any internal taxation of any kind in excess of that im-
posed directly or indirectly on similar domestic products.
Furthermore, no Member State shall impose on the products of other
Member States any internal taxation of such a nature as to afford indirect
protection to other products.
Member States shall, not later than at the beginning of the second
stage, repeal or amend any provisions existing when this Treaty enters into
force which conflict with the preceding rules.
Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 95, 1973
Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-I1) (official English translation), 298 U.N.T.S. 3, 53
(1958) (unofficial English translation) [hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty].
2. The original member states of the European Economic Community were
France, Italy, West Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg. EEC
Treaty, supra note 1, preamble. The United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark joined
the EEC on January 1, 1973. Treaty of Accession, Jan. 22, 1972, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S.
No. I (Cmd. 5179-I); see SWEET & MAXWELL'S EUROPEAN COMMUNITY TREATIES (4th
ed. 1980) 270 (unofficial translation) [hereinafter cited as SWEET & MAXWELL'S]; see
also 11 I.L.M. 397 (report of the Commission of the European Communities (Corn-
mission) on the enlarged Community). Greece became the tenth member state in
1979. Treaty of Accession of the Hellenic Republic, May 28,1979, 22 OJ. EUR.
COMM. (No. L 291) 9 (1979), 18 I.L.M. 897; see SWEET & MAXWELL'S, supra, at 335.
3. The European Economic Community (EEC) has its post World War II roots
in the proposal made by M. Robert Schuman, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs,
on May 9, 1950, to merge the French and German coal and steel industries. D. WY-
A'rr & A. DASHWOOD, THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF THE EEC 3 (1980). The Schuman
proposal was accepted by the Benelux countries, France, Germany, and Italy. The
Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, Apr. 18, 1951, 1973
Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 2 (Cmd. 5189), 261 U.N.T.S. 140 [hereinafter cited as ECSC
Treaty], was signed on April 18, 1951 and came into force on July 20, 1952. The
ECSC treaty established four major institutions: a High Authority, a Special Council
of Ministers, a Common Assembly, and a Court ofJustice. Id. art. 7.
On March 25, 1957, the EEC Treaty and the Treaty establishing the European
Atomic Energy Commission, March 25, 1957, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. I (Cmd. 5179-
II), 298 U.N.T.S. 169, were signed. They came into force on January 1, 1958 and
provided for a single Assembly and Court ofJustice for the EEC, European Coal and
Steel Community (ECSC), and the European Atomic Energy Commission (Euratom).
The process of rationalization was advanced in 1967 when a single Commission of
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criminate against imports from other member states. Article
177 of the Treaty empowers a national court to refer questions
to the European Court of Justice4 (Court) in cases before it
that implicate the Treaty.5 Article 169 of the Treaty gives the
Commission of the European Communities 6 (Commission) the
authority to issue reasoned opinions concerning the construc-
tion of the Treaty and the compliance of member states with its
requirements.7 If a member state which is the subject of one of
these opinions declines to follow its recommendations, the
the European Communities was created to carry out the functions of the Commis-
sions of the EEC and Euratom and the High Authority of the ECSC. See infra note 7.
4. The Court of Justice has its origin in the ECSC Court. ECSC Treaty, supra
note 3, art. 45, protocol on the Statute of the Court ofJustice. The Court adminis-
ters three bodies of Community law, those of the ECSC, Euratom, and the EEC.
Convention Relating to Certain Institutions Common to the European Communities,
Mar. 25, 1957, § 11, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-I); see SWEET & MAX-
WELL'S, supra note 2, at 230. The jurisdiction of the Court is defined in articles 169-
83 of the EEC Treaty, supra note 1. For present purposes, only article 169, infra note
7, and article 177, infra note 5, are relevant. See also The Court of Justice of the
European Communities, EEC Periodical 4/1983.
5. The Court finds its jurisdiction to hear matters implicating Community law
which arise in the course of litigation in the national courts in article 177 of the EEC
Treaty.
The Court of Justice shall have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings
concerning:
(a) the interpretation of this Treaty;
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the
Community;
(c) the interpretation of the statutes of bodies established by an act of
the Council, where those statutes so provide.
Where any such question is raised in a case pending before court or
tribunal of a Member State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a
decision on the question is necessary to enable it to render judgment, re-
quest the Court of Justice to give a ruling thereon.
Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or
tribunal of a Member State, against whose decisions there is no judicial rem-
edy under national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the matter to the
Court of Justice.
EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 177.
6. The Commission of the European Communities replaced the EEC Commis-
sion, the Euratom Commission, and the High Authority of the Coal and Steel Com-
munity on July 1, 1967. It was created by the Treaty establishing a Single Council
and a Single Commission of the European Communities, Apr. 8, 1965, 1973 Gr. Brit.
T.S. No. I (Cmd. 5179-II); see SWEET & MAXWELL'S, supra note 2, at 233, and exercises
the powers and competences of those former authorities.
7. Article 169 of the EEC Treaty provides the Commission with a mechanism by
which to carry out its authority.
If the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfill an
obligation under this Treaty, it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the mat-
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Commission may seek a ruling on the matter from the Court.'
An examination of the decisions of the Court construing
article 95 reveals a dichotomy. The Court frequently applies
an exception 9 to article 95's broad prohibition to cases reach-
ing it by way of a private suit pursuant to article 177, but never
in cases initiated by the Commission under article 169. Conse-
quently, the tax systems addressed in article 177 cases have
generally been found to be valid.' ° These cases do not con-
strue articles 169 and 177; rather they all address article 95.
Articles 169 and 177 simply define the procedural posture of
the cases. As a result, there is an inconsistent body of case law
construing this very important article.
This is particularly problematic for private parties such as
importers seeking to judge the price at which they will sell
their imported products." There exists too great an element
of uncertainty as to which products and classes of products are
similar or in competition with one another so that they should
ter after giving the State concerned the opportunity to submit its observa-
tion.
If the State concerned does not comply with the opinion within the pe-
riod laid down by the Commission, the latter may bring the matter before
the Court of Justice.
EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 169.
8. Id.
9. The Court has allowed taxes which coincidentally fell more heavily on im-
ports than on domestic products where eligibility for the tax advantage is (1) based
upon objective criteria; (2) promotes economic policy objectives which are compati-
ble with the EEC Treaty; and (3) are not such that imports cannot possibly fulfill their
requirements. However, the importing state may require that the imports fulfill
every one of the criteria for eligibility. See infra notes 119-22, 128-30, 262-77 and
accompanying text.
10. See Schneider-Import GmbH & Co. KG v. Hauptzollamt Mainz, 1980 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 3469, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8700; Rumhaus Hansen GmbH & Co. v. Hauptzollamt Flensburg, 1981 E. Comm.
Ct.J. Rep. 1165, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8754; SpA
Vinal v. SpA Orbat, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 77, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] Com-
MON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8724; Chemial Farmaceutici SpA v. DAF SpA, 1981 E.
Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 1, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8723;
Hauptzollamt Flensburg v. Hermann C. Andresen GmbH & Co. KG, 1981 E. Comm.
Ct.J. Rep. 2835, [1981-83 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8777. But
see Hans Just I/S v. Danish Ministry for Fiscal Affairs, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 501,
[1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8650.
11. Vinal, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 79, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8724, at 8727; Chemial, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 13, [1979-81
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8723, at 8715.
120 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 8:117
bear the same tax burden.' 2 Because of the inconsistent appli-
cation of the exception to article 95's prohibitions, the ratio-
nales underlying cases decided via the article 169 route are of
little use to counsel and their clients in an article 177 proceed-
ing.' 3 Therefore, no member state has successfully raised the
exception in defense of a challenged tax system. 14
This Note examines the Court's current construction of
article 95. This construction involves a fairly strict and
straightforward application of article 95's broad prohibition
upon discriminatory internal taxation by one member state
against imports from another member state.' 5 The basis for
this construction is found in a group of cases collectively
known as the Alcohol Cases' 6 and their progeny.' 7 However,
12. For a discussion of comparability of the tax burdens, see infra notes 55-60
and accompanying text.
13. In many of the cases reaching the Court by the article 169 route, the national
governments argued that there had been no protective effect from the challenged tax
scheme. These arguments were rejected by the Court because it feared that to do so
would crystalize preexisting patterns of discrimination. Commission of the European
Communities v. French Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 347, 368, [1979-81
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8647, at 7666; Commission of the
European Communities v. Italian Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 385, 407,
[1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8648, at 7682. However,
when the plaintiffs in Vinal, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 77, [1979-81 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8724 and Chemial, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 1, [1979-
81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8723, complained of a tax scheme
which had demonstrably had the effect of keeping out all competing imports, the
Court allowed it to stand.
14. See, e.g., Commission of the European Communities v. Italian Republic, 1983
E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 601, 618-21, [1981-83 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 8928, at 8827; Commission v. French Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep.
at 362-63, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8647, at 7663-64;
Commission v. Italian Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 402-03, [1979-81
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8648, at 7680; Commission of the
European Communities v. Kingdom of Denmark, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 447,
465-66, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8649, at 7696.
15. See iqfra notes 60-75 and accompanying text.
16. Commission of the European Communities v. United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, 1983 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 2265, [1981-83 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8943; Commission of the European Communi-
ties v. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J.
Rep. 417, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8651; Commis-
sion v. French Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 347, [1979-81 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MET. REP. (CCH) 8647; Commission v. Italian Republic, 1980 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 385, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8648; Com-
mission v. Kingdom of Denmark, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 447, [1979-81 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8649; see also A.J. EASSON, TAX LAW AND POLICY
IN THE EEC 28 (1980).
17. See Commission v. Italian Republic, 1983 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 601, [1981- -
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the Court has also created an exception to this broad prohibi-
tion. The member state will be allowed to provide tax advan-
tages to certain classes of products or producers. However,
the criteria for eligibility for the advantage must be based upon
objective criteria," promote economic policy goals compatible
with those of the Treaty,' 9 and must not be devised so that
imports can not possibly meet them.z" The exception is con-
sistent with the policies of article 95. However, an inconsis-
tency is revealed by an examination of the facts of the excep-
tion cases. The Court is generally unwilling to strike down
policy based rules of the member states when the question is
presented in the context of a private suit. 2 The Court almost
invariably strikes down these provisions when presented in a
suit brought by the Commission against the member state. 3
This Note will define this exception in the context of cases
reaching the Court by both procedural routes.24
I. ARTICLE 95
A. The Purpose of Article 95
The chief economic purpose of the EEC is to achieve a
common market by removing and preventing impediments to
free trade.2 5  Article 95 supplements the provisions of the
Treaty on the abolition of customs duties and charges having
83 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8928; Commission v. Italian Re-
public, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 1, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 8631.
18. H. Hansen jun. & O.C. Balle GmbH & Co. v. Hauptzollamt Flensburg, 1978
E. Cpmm. Ct. J. Rep. 1787, [1978-79 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8511 ; see infra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
19. Vinal, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 77, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8724; Chemial, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 1, [1979-81 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 8723; Hansen & Balle, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 1787, [1978-79 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8511; see infra
notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 25-30 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 103-33 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 134-276 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 76-83 and accompanying text.
25. Commission v. French Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 347, [1979-81
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8647, at 7661-62; Commission v. Ital-
ian Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 385, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8648, at 7678; Commission v. Kingdom of Denmark, 1980 E.
1984]
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equivalent effect. 26 The aim of article 95 is to "ensure the free
movement of goods between the Member States under normal
conditions of competition by eliminating all forms of protec-
tion that result from the application of internal taxation which
discriminates against products from other Member States." 2 7
Article 95 is "intended to fill in any breaches which a fiscal
measure might open up" in the prohibition laid down by the
provisions relating to the free movement of goods.2 s
Thus, in order to ensure equality of competition, 29 article
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 447, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8649, at 7693.
26. Commission v. French Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 347, [1979-81
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8647, at 7661-62; Commission v. Ital-
ian Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 385, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8648, at 7678; Commission v. Kingdom of Denmark, 1980 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 447, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8649, at 7693; A.J. EASSON, supra note 16, at 6-7. "[A]ny pecuniary charge, how-
ever small and whatever its designation and mode of application, which is imposed
unilaterally on domestic or foreign goods by reason of the fact that they cross a fron-
tier . . . constitutes a charge having an equivalent effect to a customs duty. Id.
(citation omitted).
27. Commission v. French Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 347, [1979-81
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8647, at 7661; Commission v. Italian
Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 385, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8648, at 7678; Commission v. Kingdom of Denmark, 1980 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 447, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8649, at
7694.
28. A.J. EASSON, supra note 16, at 5; see also Commission v. Italian Republic, 1980
E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 1, 12-13, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8631, at 7468. Speaking in the context of an article 95(1) "similar products" case
the Court said:
[t]he first paragraph of Article 95-the purpose of which is ensure that the
Treaty provisions relating to the abolition of customs duties and charges
having equivalent effect cannot be evaded or rendered nugatory by the in-
troduction of internal taxation discriminating against imported products in
comparison with domestic products-implements a fundamental principle
of the Common Market.
Id. It is the author's belief that this reasoning is applicable to the entire article and
not just paragraph one.
29. August Stier v. Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Ericus, 1968 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
235, [1967-70 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8070; A.J. EASSON, supra
note 17, at 1; see Opinion of Advocate-General Gand, 1968 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 165,
[1967-70 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8064, at 7992.
The purpose of this provision is to ensure equality of competition and it is
valid only within this limit but if there are neither similar products nor prod-
ucts which may be substituted for them it is not possible to find in Article 95
any provision limiting the right of the importing state to impose taxation.
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95 requires that one product not bear an unduly heavy tax bur-
den in relation to another with which it competes.3 0
B. The Structure of Article 95
Article 95 consists of three paragraphs, although this Note
addresses only the first two.3 I Article 95(1) forbids the imposi-
tion, directly or indirectly, of any internal taxation upon im-
ports from other member states in excess of that imposed
upon similar domestic products.3 2 Consequently, the first determi-
nation to be made is whether the domestic and imported prod-
ucts are "similar" within the meaning of this paragraph. If
they are similar, they must bear the same tax burden. Factors
used in the comparison of the relative tax burdens include the
tax rate, the method of assessment, and the base to which the
tax is applied.3 3 This paragraph is to be interpreted broadly so
as to draw under its coverage all tax procedures and all similar
products.3 4
In each of the Alcohol Cases, 35 the same language is em-
ployed in defining similar products within the meaning of art-
icle 95(1). "[I]t is necessary to consider as similar products
[those] which 'have similar characteristics and meet the same
30. See infra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
31. Article 95(3) requires the member states to repeal or amend any provisions
of their domestic law which conflict with 95(l) or (2) no later than the beginning of
the second stage. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 95(3). The EEC Treaty provides for
three transitional stages of four years each. Id. arts, 8(1)-(2). Thus, the second stage
began on January 1, 1962, four years after the Treaty came into force. A.J. EASSON,
supra note 16, at 53, n.78.
32. For the provisions of article 95(i) of the EEC Treaty, see supra note 1. See
also supra note 29.
33. A.J. EASSON, supra note 16, at 29-30.
34. Commission v. French Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 359, [1979-
81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8647, at 7661; Commission v. Ital-
ian Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 399, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8648, at 7678; Commission v. Kingdom of Denmark, 1980 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 462, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8649, at 7694.
35. Commission v. United Kingdom II, 1983 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 2265, [1981-
83 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8943; Commission v. French Re-
public, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 347, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8647; Commission v. Italian Republic, 1980 E. Comm. CtJ. Rep. 385,
[1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8648; Commission v. King-
dom of Denmark, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 447, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COM-
MON MKT. REP. (CCH) $ 8649; Commission v. United Kingdom I, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.
J. Rep. 417, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8651.
19841
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needs from the point of view of consumers.' "36 Therefore, the
scope of article 95(1) is determined not by the strictly identical
nature of the products but by their having similar and compa-
rable uses as perceived by the consumer. 7
Article 95(2) forbids the imposition of any internal taxa-
tion upon imports from other member states which affords in-
direct protection to other domestic products .38 This paragraph oper-
ates as something of a catch-all. It is intended to prohibit all
forms of indirect tax protection of domestic products which,
although not similar to imported products, are nonetheless in
"partial, indirect, or potential competition '39 with them. In
keeping with the broader scope of this paragraph and due to
the difficulty of making sufficiently precise comparisons be-
tween the products in question,40 the inquiry focuses on "the
protective nature of the system of internal taxation."'" As with
36. Commission v. French Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 359-60,
[1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8647, at 7661; Commission
v. Italian Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 400, [1979-81 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 8648, at 7678; Commission v. Kingdom of Denmark,
1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 462-63, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 8649, at 7694. (all quoting Rewe-Zentrale des Lebensmittel-Grosshandels
GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Landau/Pfalz, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 181, 194, [1976
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8343, at 7238.
37. Commission v. French Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 360, [1979-
81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8647, at 7661; Commission v. Ital-
ian Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 400, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8648, at 7678; Commission v. Kingdom of Denmark, 1980 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 462-63, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8649, at 7694.
38. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 95(1).
39. Commission v. French Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 360, [1979-
81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) $ 8647, at 7661; Commission v. Ital-
ian Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 400, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8648, at 7678; Commission v. Kingdom of Denmark, 1980 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 463, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
1 8649, at 7694.
40. Commission v. French Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 360, [1979-
81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) $ 8647, at 7661; Commission v. Ital-
ian Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 400, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) $ 8648, at 7678; Commission v. Kingdom of Denmark, 1980 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 463, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8649, at 7694.
41. Commission v. French Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 360, [1979-
81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8647, at 7662; Commission v. Ital-
ian Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 400, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) $ 8648, at 7678; Commission v. Kingdom of Denmark, 1980 E.
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article 95(1),42 a dual analysis must be made under article
95(2). Are the two products in actual or potential competition
with one another? If so, does the tax system afford indirect
protection to the domestic products?43
To implicate article 95(2), it is sufficient that one of the
economic uses of the imported product puts it in competition
with a domestic product. 4 4 Present competition is not the test.
The Court has said that the possibility of competition in the
future may implicate article 95(2)." 5 What is more, in deter-
mining the existence of a competitive relationship under arti-
cle 95(2), it is "necessary to consider not only the present state
of the market but also the possibilities for development within
the context of free movement of goods at the Community level
and the further potential for the substitution of products for
one another which may be revealed by intensification of
trade."4 6 Thus, for instance, the fact that in the United King-
dom, beer and wine were virtually never sold in the same out-
lets, or consumed in the same places or by the same people did
not preclude a finding that they were in competition within the
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 463, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8649, at 7694.
42. See supra notes 31-34 and accompanying text.
43. Commission v. United Kingdom I, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 432-33,
[1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8651, at 7724.
44. Commission v. French Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 360, [1979-
81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8647, at 7661; Commission v. Ital-
ian Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 400, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8648, at 7678; Commission v. Kingdom of Denmark, 1980 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 463, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8649, at 7694; see also Firma Fink-Fruncht GmbH v. Hauptzollamt Munchen-Land-
sbergerstrasse, 1968 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 223, 232, [1967-70 Transfer Binder] COM-
MON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8069, at 8039. Thus, for instance, petroleum could be a
product in competition with both coal and iron ore. It competes with coal as a fuel
and with iron ore as a feedstock for plastics.
45. Commission v. United Kingdom I, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 432, [1979-
81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8651, at 7724.
46. Id. This great faith on the part of the Court that consumers would take up
drinking the drinks of their neighbors if only the distorting effects of fiscal measures
were removed is not supported by experience. See Gentlemen's War-A Survey of the
Worlds Trade in Distilled Spirits, The Economist, Dec. 22, 1984-Jan. 4, 1985, survey
insert. This survey found that "drinking remains embedded in the heart of people's
social traditions, and most people, most of the time, remain conservative. They still
drink the local hooches, most of which, inevitably, are unexportable . . . . Local
spirits retain their dominance in most markets." Id. survey insert at 6; see infra note
283 and accompanying text.
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meaning of article 95(2). 47 Nor is it necessary that the plaintiff
show the protective effect statistically;48 it is enough to show
that a "given tax mechanism is likely, in view of its inherent
characteristics, to bring about the protective effect."
49
Finally, given the broad sweep of article 95(2),"° the Court
often does not constrain itself to making a finding of similarity
under article 95(1). For instance, in the Alcohol Cases,5' the
Court concluded that some of the products in issue were simi-
lar and that
[e]ven in cases in which it is impossible to recognize a suffi-
cient degree of similarity between the products concerned,
there are nevertheless, in the case of all spirits, common
characteristics which are sufficiently pronounced to accept
that in all cases there is at least partial or potential competi-
tion. . . . It appears from the foregoing that Article 95,
taken as a whole, may apply without distinction to all the prod-
ucts concerned.52
Such a broad reading of article 95(2) is necessary in order to
give effect to the purpose of article 95.53
C. Comparability of the Tax Burden
The plain meaning of the prohibitions in article 95 is that
47. See infra notes 285-87 and accompanying text.
48. Commission v. United Kingdom I, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 433, [1979-
81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) $ 8651, at 7724.
49. Id.
50. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 95(2). For the provisions of article 95(2), see
supra note 1.
51. Commission v. United Kingdom II, 1983 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 2265, [1981-
83 Transfer Binder] COMMON MET. REP. (CCH) 8943; Commission v. French Re-
public, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 347, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8647; Commission v. Italian Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 385,
[1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8648; Commission v. King-
dom of Denmark, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 447, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COM-
MON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8649; Commission v. United Kingdom I, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.
J. Rep. 417, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8651; see also
Aj. EASSON, supra note 16, at 28.
52. Commission v. French Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 362, [1979-
81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8647, at 7663; Commission v. Ital-
ian Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 402, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8648, at 7679; Commission v. Kingdom of Denmark, 1980 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 465, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8649, at 7695. (emphasis added).
53. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
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imported products should not bear a heavier tax burden than
similar or competing domestic products. 54  "[T]he effective
burden is arrived at by applying the tax rate, expressed as a
percentage or as a sum of money, to the relevant tax base, ex-
pressed in terms of value, volume, quantity, or other character-
istic (e.g. alcoholic strength) of the products."55 For example,
a member state may produce large quantities of various grades
of beet sugar but no cane sugar, and import various grades of
sugar made from both basic materials. The offending tax
scheme could tax both at the same rate per economic unit. A
tax of ten percent on the sales price of each would appear to be
equal. If, however, the predominantly domestic beet sugar
were taxed based on its warehouse price in one hundred
pound bags while the imported cane sugar was taxed based
upon the retail store price in one pound boxes, the burden on
the latter would be far greater. The same tax rate applied to
different tax bases results in discrimination against the
56imports.
On the other hand, it is sometimes permissible to attach a
higher tax to an import than to a similar or competing domes-
tic product. Article 97 allows member states to fix average
compensatory tax rates, provided the import does not end up
in a worse position than the domestic product.57 An example
is found in a turnover equalization tax.58 France might tax the
making of wine in small increments at the grape stage, then
each year as the bottles lie in the chateau's cellar, again at the
54. See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
55. A.J. EASSON, supra note 16, at 21.
56. If a sales tax of 10% were applied, there would be a discriminatory effect
under these circumstances. A five pound bag which sold at retail for $2.00 would
carry $.20 in tax, or $.04 per pound. A hundred pound bag selling at wholesale price
of $20.00 would carry $2.00 in tax, or $.02 per pound. Thus, the domestic sugar
would have a 100% tax advantage over the import.
57. Article 97 of the Treaty pertains to cumulative turnover taxes.
Member States which levy a turnover tax calculated by a cumulative
multi-stage system may, in the case of internal charges imposed by them on
imported products or of repayments allowed by them on exported products,
establish average rates for products or groups of products, provided that
there is no infringement of the principles laid down in Articles 95 and 96.
Where the average rates established by a Member State do not conform
with these principles, the Commission shall issue appropriate directives or
decisions to the State concerned.
EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 97.
58. Id.
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sale from the chateau to a negotiant, and lastly upon the sale to
the wine shop owner. Germany, on the other hand, might tax
it only at the last two stages, but more heavily at each stage.
France could apply a turnover equalization tax to imports of
German wine so that they would carry an equal tax burden.59
II. THE ELEMENTS OF AN ARTICLE 95 ACTION
A. Internal Taxation
Both paragraphs one and two of article 9560 forbid dis-
criminatory internal taxation. Consequently, it is necessary to
define internal taxation within the meaning of that article. The
definition or label applied by the member state is not impor-
tant; rather, the basic characteristics of the measure must be
examined.6 '
Financial exactions of any sort are treated as taxes for the
purposes of article 95.62 In Simmenthal S.p.A. v. Italian Minister
for Finance,63 the Court stated that
pecuniary charges levied on the occasion of veterinary and
public health inspections either at the frontier on imported
goods alone or on the occasion of internal inspections of
both imported and domestic products constitute taxes...
and are therefore prohibited or internal taxation coming
within the rule on nondiscrimination laid down by Article
95 of the Treaty.64
59. Id.
60. Id. art. 95.
61. A.J. EASSON, supra note 16, at 17-18.
62. Id.
63. 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1871, [1976 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8388.
64. Id. at 1888, [1976 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8388, at
7978. The Court made reference in Simmenthal to article 9 of the Treaty which estab-
lishes the customs union, one of the foundations of the Community.
1. The Community shall be based upon a customs union which shall cover
all trade in goods and which shall involve the prohibition as between Mem-
ber States of customs duties on imports or exports and of all charges having
equivalent effect, and the adoption of a common customs tariff in their rela-
tions with third countrires.
2. The provisions of Chapter 1, Section 1, and of Chapter 2 of this Title
shall apply to products originating in Member States and to products which
come from third countries and which in free circulation in Member States.
EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 9.
There is also an interesting comparison to be seen between the rationale of the
Court in Simmenthal and that of the United States Supreme Court in Brown v. Mary-
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There, tax charged at the frontier was held to be an internal
tax. 65 In another case, a levy on the sale of reprographic ma-
chines, both domestically manufactured and imported, was im-
posed by France.66 The sums raised were allocated entirely to
a special account called the National Book Fund. 67 The Fund,
inter alia, subsidized "the publication of quality works and the
purchase of both French and foreign books by libraries and the
land, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827). In Brown, the Supreme Court construed the
following constitutional language: "No state shall ... lay any Imposts or Duties on
Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it's in-
spection laws .... " U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2. The Court found that the words
of limitation ending that clause went to show the full extent of the meaning of the
word taxation.
The tax or duty of inspection, then, is a tax which is frequently, if not always
paid for service performed on land, while the article is in the bosom of the
country. Yet this tax is an exception to the prohibition on the states to lay
duties on imports or exports. The exception was made because the tax
would otherwise have been within the prohibition.
25 U.S. at 438.
65. Simmenthal, 1976 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 1889-90, [1976 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8388, at 7978-79.
66. Commission of the European Communities v. French Republic, 1981 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 283, 298-99, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 8733, at 8810. However, it should be noted that only one percent of the
relevant products were made in France. Id. For this reason, the Commission sought
to characterize the charge as being equivalent to a customs duty and thus forbidden
under articles 9, 12 and 13. Id. at 300, [1976 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 8733, at 8811. For the provisions of article 9, see supra note 64. But see
Commission of the European Communities v. Kingdom of Denmark, 1983 E. Comm.
Ct.J. Rep. -, 3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 14,024. Denmark imposed the cost of
health related inspections upon undertakings selling groundnuts, which were entirely
imported. The Kingdom of Denmark argued that the decision of the Court in Com-
mission v. French Republic, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 283, [1979-81 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8733,
does not prohibit the Member States from subjecting imported products to
an internal tax when there are no identical or similar national products or
other products which require protection. In such a case, the duty is imposed
"in good faith" because the chosen method of payment would have been the
same had Denmark produced ground nuts. . . . The Court of Justice [re-
sponded that it] has consistently held that any pecuniary charge, whatever
its designation or mode of application, which is imposed unilaterally on
goods by reason of the fact that they cross a frontier, and which is not a
customs duty in the strict sense, constitutes a charge having an effect
equivalent to a customs duty within the meaning of Articles 9, 12, 13, and 16
of the Treaty.
3 COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 14,024, at 14,391.
67. Commission v. French Republic, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 299, [1979-
81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8733, at 8811.
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translation of foreign works into French."' 68 The levy was held
to be an internal tax within the meaning of article 95.69
B. Directly or Indirectly on Products
The Court found an internal tax indirectly imposed on a
product where West Germany imposed a road use tax of four
pfennigs per metric ton per kilometer for the transport of
gravel.7" The gravel, when sold, bore the added charge.7
Given that a levy upon an item is going to affect its behavior in
the field of competition, what tax is not at least indirectly a tax
imposed on the product?72 This element is perhaps most
quickly and easily explained by reference to the famous logic
of ChiefJustice Marshall in Brown v. Maryland.13 "All must per-
ceive that a tax on the sale of an article, imported only for sale,
is a tax on the article itself. . . . So a tax on the occupation of
an importer is, in like manner, a tax in importation. '74 Simi-
larly, the Court found a discriminatory tax imposed by Ireland
where that country gave domestic "producers of spirits, beer,
and made wine. . . [a] deferment of payment. . . [of taxes] of
between four and six weeks . . . whereas, in the case of the
same products from other Member States, the duty . . . [was]
payable either at the date of importation or of delivery from
the customs warehouse."
75
68. Id.
69. Id. at 302, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8733, at
8812.
70. Firma Schottle & Sohne OHG v. Finanzamt Freudenstadt, 1977 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 247, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8394. A
pfennig is one hundredth of a mark. At the time of publication, the current exchange
rate put the value of one pfennig at U.S. $.0034.
71. Schottle & Sohne, 1977 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 251, [1977-78 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MET. REP. (CCH) 8394, at 7122-23.
72. See Commission of the European Communities v. Italian Republic, 1965 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 857, 866, [1961-66 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8038, at 7542. In that decision, the Court defined the meaning of direct and indi-
rect taxation: "As used in Article 96, the expression 'directly' must be understood to
refer to taxation imposed on the finished product, whilst the expression 'indirectly'
refers to taxation imposed during the various stages of production on the raw materi-
als or semi-finished products used in the manufacture of the product." Id. at 866,
[1961-66 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8038, at 7542.
73. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
74. Id. at 444.
75. Commission of the European Communities v. Ireland, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J.
Rep. 481, 490, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8652, at
7733. It is interesting to note that until November 1, 1984 the United Kingdom
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III. THE PROCEDURAL ROUTES TO THE COURT
The parties in article 95 cases reaching the Court by the
article 177 route 76 are generally a private business, often an
importer, and a member state's revenue agency.77 The private
party will carry an item into the member state and a tax is as-
sessed on the item, either at the frontier or later. Once the tax
is paid, the importer seeks a refund in the national courts. The
importer disputes the tax in light of the taxes imposed on simi-
lar or competing domestic products. 78 The national court re-
fers the question of the legality of the tax in light of article 95
to the Court.7 9 As a consequence of this procedural route, the
effectively subsidized importers by not collecting import duties for up to eleven
weeks after the goods had been landed. After that date, importers will be required to
pay taxes due as the goods arrive in the country. Cash In Hand, The Economist, Aug.
25-31, 1984, at 49-50.
76. EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 177. For the provisions of article 177, see
supra note 5.
77. Andresen, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 2836, [1981-83 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) $ 8777, at 7257; Rurnhaus Hansen 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J.
Rep. at 1177-78, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MET. REP. (CCH) 8754, at
8998-99; Hans just, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 516, [1979-81 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MET. REP. (CCH) 8650, at 7709-10. In this regard, Vinal, 1981 E. Comm.
Ct. J. Rep. 77, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MET. REP. (CCH) 8724 and
Chemial, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 1, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MET. REP.
(CCH) 8723, are out of the ordinary in more than just their results. It should be
noted that in article 169 cases, the named parties are always the Commission and a
member state or its revenue agency. In article 177 cases, the named parties are gen-
erally a revenue agency and a private party. In Chemial and Vinal, both named parties
are private undertakings. Vinal, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 90, [1979-81 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MET. REP. (CCH) 8724, at 8727; Chemial, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. at 10, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8723, at 8715.
In fact, the Italian government asked the Court to decline jurisdiction, asking if this
was "not really a fictious dispute and whether the procedure under article 177 has
not been employed in this case to impeach the Italian State in the absence of any
actual dispute giving rise to questions of Community law as between the parties."
Vinal, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 91, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8724, at 8727; Chemial, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 10, [1979-81
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8723, at 8715.
78. Andresen, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 2847, [1981-83 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8777, at 7257; Rumhaus Hansen, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J.
Rep. at 1178, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MET. REP. (CCH) 8754, at 8998-
99; HansJst, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 516, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MET. REP. (CCH) 8754, at 7709-10.
79. Andresen, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 2847, [1981-83 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8777, at 7257; Rumhaus Hansen, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J.
Rep. at 1178, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8754, at 8998-
99; HansJusi, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 516, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MET. REP. (CCH) 8754, at 7709-10.
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Court is determining the fairness of the application of a partic-
ular section of a member state's tax code 80 to a specific quan-
tity of an item of identifiable grade and characteristics.8 The
result is a narrow, fact specific analysis.
In an article 95 action reaching the Court through an arti-
cle 169 proceeding, the reasoned opinions issued by the Com-
mission frequently deal with an entire product line, both do-
mestic and imported.8 2 Thus, these cases, result in decisions
construing very broad questions. The earlier example of beet
and cane sugar is illustrative here.83 Is there discrimination in
favor of a domestic product if a certain grade of beet sugar,
which is both imported and domestic, is favored by the tax
scheme, while none of the entirely imported cane sugar is
favored?
IV. THE ARTICLE 177 CASES
A common thread is found running through cases reach-
ing the Court via article 177. The Court generally favors the
national governments in suits by importers alleging discrimi-
natory tax schemes.84 This exception to article 95's broad pro-
hibition of discriminatory taxation is enunciated in Hansen &
80. Andresen, 1891 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 2837, [1981-83 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8777, at 7257 (articles 58, 78, 79, 84 and 151(1) of the
German Law on the Spirits Monopoly); Rumhaus Hansen, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep.
at 1167, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8754, at 8998-99
(same); HansJust, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 515, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COM-
MON M T. REP. (CCH) 8650, at 7709-10 (Danish Consolidated Law No. 151 of
April 4, 1978); Vinal, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 89-90, [1979-81 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8724, at 8727 (Decree-Law No. 1200 of October 6,
1948, as amended by Decree-Law No. 836 of September 16, 1955, and Article 3 of
Law No. 506 of August 18, 1978); Chemial, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 10, [1979-81
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8723, at 8715 (same).
81. Rewe-Zentrale, 1976 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 183, [1976 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8733, at 7231 (16,000 liters of Vermouth); Schneider-
Import, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 3471, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8700, at 8370 (23,118 liters of Remy Martin VSOP).
82. Commission v. Kingdom of Denmark, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 471,
[1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8649, at 7698-99. In this
case, the Court considered the relationship between a single type of alcoholic drink
and all other alcoholic drinks. "It is therefore necessary to appraise the existence of
either a relationship of similarity or competition between a single product and an
indeterminate number of products some of which are identified by the law whereas
others are not specified." Id.
83. See text accompanying notes 55-56.
84. See infra notes 103-33 and accompanying text.
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Balle8 5 where the Court stated:
At the present stage of its development . . . Community
law does not prohibit the Member States from granting tax
advantages, in the form of exemption from or reduction of
duties . . . to certain classes of producers. Indeed, tax ad-
vantages of this kind may serve legitimate economic or so-
cial purposes, such as the use of certain raw materials by the
distilling industry, the continued production of particular
spirits of high quality, or the continuance of certain classes
of undertakings, such as agricultural distilleries.8 6
A further statement of the Hansen & Balle exception is found in
two cases decided the same day, S.p.A. Vinal v. S.p.A. Orbat 87
and Chemial Farmaceutici S.p.A. v. DAF S.p.A. 88 In both of these
cases, the Court stated:
in its present stage of development Community law does
not restrict the freedom of each Member State to lay down
tax arrangements which differentiate between certain prod-
ucts on the basis of objective criteria, such as the nature of
the raw materials used or the production processes em-
ployed. Such differentiation is compatible with Community
law if it pursues economic policy objectives which are them-
selves compatible with the requirements of the Treaty."'
An examination of recent cases reaching the Court via the arti-
cle 177 route reveals that this definition of the exception has
been further refined. This refinement was made in a series of
cases involving the Hansen group of importers.90
85. 1978 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 1787, [1978-79 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8511.
86. Id. at 1806-07, [1978-79 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8511, at 7249.
87. Vinal, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 77, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8724.
88. Chemial, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 1, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8723.
89. Vinal, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 93, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8724, at 8717; Chemial, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 15, [1979-81
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) $ 8723, at 8729.
90. See infra notes 123-33 and accompanying text.
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A. The Individual Cases
1. Hans Just v. Danish Ministry for Fiscal Affairs
The plaintiff in Hans Just9 was an importer of spirits into
Denmark. 2 In June 1978, it imported a small quantity of aq-
uavit and larger quantities of other spirits.93 These were taxed
at differing rates. 94 Hans Just protested the tax differential, but
paid anyway. It then brought suit seeking a refund from the
Danish Ministry for Fiscal Affairs.95 The national court re-
ferred to the Court, inter alia, the question of whether it was
contrary to the Treaty to distinguish aquavit from other spirits,
bearing in mind that "the two categories are distinguished
through a definition based on content in raw materials and ex-
tracts, and on strength and characteristics of taste."
96
The Court answered this question by reference to its deci-
sion that same day in Commission v. Kingdom of Denmark.97 "A
tax system which consists in conferring a tax advantage on a
single product which represents the major proportion of do-
mestic production to the exclusion of all other similar or com-
peting imported products is incompatible with Community
law." 98 However, the validity of this holding is in question, at
least in article 177 cases, in light of the Court's rationale in the
exception cases. 99
The plaintiff in Hans Just had the good fortune to be
before the Court at the same time and on facts similar to those
addressed in Commission v. Kingdom of Denmark.'00 Both cases
addressed the legality of article 2 of Coordinated Law No. 151
91. 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 501, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) $ 8650.
92. Id. at 516, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) $ 8650, at
7710.
93. Id.
94. See inifra notes 181-84 and accompanying text.
95. Hans Just, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 516, [1979-81 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8650, at 7710.
96. Id.
97. 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 447 [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) $ 8649.
98. Hans Just, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 519, [1979-81 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8650, at 7711.
99. See infra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.
100. 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 447, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8649.
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of April 4, 1978 in light of article 95.101 Since the Court re-
fused the Danish Government's request to apply the exception
to article 95's broad prohibition in Commission v. Kingdom of
Denmark,'0 2 it was virtually impossible for the Court to apply
the exception in Hans Just. Consequently, Hans Just is some-
thing of an anomaly among the article 177 cases because the
plaintiff prevailed.
2. Chemial Farmaceutici v. DAF and Vinal v. Orbat
Chemiall10 and Vinal104 are essentially interchangeable.
They arise out of similar facts' 0 5 and ask the Court to answer
the same question concerning the same law.' 016 In both cases,
an Italian consumer bought denatured synthetic ehtyl alcohol
from an Italian imported. 10 7  A special revenue charge of
12,000 Italian lira per hectoliter of synthetic alcohol was added
to the sales price of each product.0 8 On the other hand, dena-
tured ethyl alcohol fermented from agricultural products bore
a special charge of only 1,000 Italian lira.' 0 9 All synthetic alco-
hol sold in Italy was imported, whereas the fermented alcohol
came exclusively from domestic production.''
101. Id. at 467, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8649, at
7696; Hans Just, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 515, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COM-
MON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8650, at 7709.
102. 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 447, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8649, at 7696.
103. 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8723.
104. 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 77, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MHT.
REP. (CCH) 8724.
105. Id. at 90, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8724, at
8727; Chemial, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 11, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8723, at 8715.
106. Vinal, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 89-90, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COM-
MON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8724, at 8727; Chemial, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 10,
[1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MET. REP. (CCH) 8723, at 8715.
107. Vinal, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 90, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MET. REP. (CCH) 8724, at 8727; Chemial, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 10, [1979-81
Transfer Binder] COMMON MET. REP. (CCH) 8723, at 8715.
108. Vinal, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 90, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8724, at 8727; Chemial, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 11, [1979-81
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8723, at 8715.
109. Vinal, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 90, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8724, at 8727; Chemial, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 11, [1979-81
Transfer Binder] COMMON MET. REP. (CCH) 8723, at 8715.
110. Vinal, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 90, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON
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The consumers, supported by the Commission,"' argued
that the two kinds of alcohol were chemically identical and
fully interchangeable in their uses. 21 2 They were thus not only
similar, but functionally identical; they could be called upon to
meet exactly the same needs. 13 The consumers further argued
that in the absence of any Italian production of synthetic alco-
hol, the tax system had the practical effect of preventing all
imports of synthetic alcohol from other member states.14
Thus, national production of fermented alcohol was directly
favored. " 5
The argument of the importers, supported by the Italian
government, ' 16 although radical, was accepted by the Court.
They pointed out that "Italy . . .[had] a considerable produc-
tion of ethylene, a petroleum derivative which is used in the
manufacture of synthetic alcohol. It is accordingly impossible
to accept that there . . . [was] discrimination against imported
synthetic alcohol when there is at least a potential for production
of the same product in Italy."' '" The radical sweep of this ra-
tionale is most evident when one notes that Italian reserves of
petroleum, the basic raw material for synthetic alcohol, are
negligible. 8
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8724, at 8727; Chemial, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 12, [1979-81
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8723, at 8716.
111. Vinal, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 92, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8724, at 8728; Chemial, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 14, [1979-81
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8723, at 8717.
112. Vinal, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 92, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8724, at 8728; Chemial, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 15, [1979-81
Transfer Binder] COMMON MET. REP. (CCH) 8723, at 8717.
113. Vinal, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 92, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8724, at 8728; Chemial, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 14, [1979-81
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8723, at 8717.
114. Vinal, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 92, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8724, at 8728; Chemial, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 15, [1979-81
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8723, at 8717.
115. Vinal, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 92, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8724, at 8728; Chemial, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 14, [1979-81
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8723, at 8717.
116. Vinal, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 92-93, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COM-
MON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8724, at 8728; Chemial, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 14,
[1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8723, at 8717.
117. Vinal, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 92, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8724, at 8728. (emphasis added).
118. See Commission of the European Communities, Review of Member States' En-
ergy Policies, COM(84) 88 Final Table 1, at 130 (1984). Italy had domestic consump-
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The difficulty with this rationale is that there are virtually
no products made in any of the member states where there is
not at least the potential for the domestic production of the
same product. Every one of the member states possesses at
least the potential for the production of all but a relatively few
industrial products. In an age of easy transportation of bulk
raw materials, the limiting factor preventing production of
many industrial products is financial. In other words, England
could discriminate against wine since it could import tons of
grapes, giving it the potential for the production of wine.
The Court restated its language from Hansen & Balle" 9 up-
holding "tax arrangements which differentiate between certain
products on the basis of objective criteria, such as the nature of
the raw materials used or the production processes em-
ployed."' 2 ° Here, the nature of the raw materials was disposi-
tive. The tax scheme also encouraged the use of abundant ag-
ricultural products and discouraged the use of imported oil. 2 '
Thus, it also pursued economic policy objectives which are
compatible with the requirements of the Treaty. 22
3. The Hansen Cases
The contributions to the jurisprudence of article 95 made
by the Hansen group of importers are extensive. For example,
Rumhaus Hansen GmbH & Co. brought suit, in 1981, to ob-
tain a refund of monopoly equalization taxes 23 paid on rum
imported into the Federal Republic of Germany from
tion of 83,570,000 tons of oil in 1982 and domestic production of only 1,790,000.
Italy imported 87,300,000 tons of oil in 1982. Id.; see also L. GRAYSON, NATIONAL OIL
COMPANIES 125, 128-29 (1981).
119. 1978 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 1806-07, [1978-79 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8562, at 7249.
120. Vinal, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 93, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8724, at 8729; Chemial, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 15, [1979-81
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8723, at 8717.
121. Vinal, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 94, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) $ 8724, at 8729; Chemial, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 15, [1979-81
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8723, at 8717.
122. Vinal, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 94, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) $ 8724, at 8729; Chemial, 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 15, [1979-81
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9 8723, at 8717.
123. Where a member state grants a monopoly on a product, it will often charge
a fee to the holder of the monopoly. See, e.g., Hansen & Balle, 1978 E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. at 1801, [1978-79 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) t 8562, at 8165.
The member state may charge a tax on imports of products of the type covered by
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Guadaloupe, an overseas department of France.1
2 4
The German court referred a question to the Court be-
cause, until then, the criteria for comparison of products under
article 95 had all been based on the particular characteristics of
the products in question and not on the conditions under
which they were produced. 25 The German court feared that
the rule of nondiscrimination in article 95 might be rendered
nugatory if member states were allowed to define eligibility for
tax advantages by a wide variety of natural, economic, and so-
cial factors. 126  The member state would be able to create a
system of seemingly objective criteria which would, in reality,
protect a class of domestic producers or products.
27
The Court held that criteria for eligibility for tax advan-
tages may be based upon conditions of production. 28 How-
ever, these conditions may not be such that imports could not
possibly fulfill them. 129 If the domestic and imported products
meet both the criterion of similarity which forms the basis of
article 95(1) and the conditions laid down under the particular
national tax legislation to qualify for the tax advantage in ques-
tion, they must be taxed at the same rate.' 3 °
the monopoly to the extent of the domestic monopoly fee. EEC Treaty, supra note 1,
art. 37.
124. THE WORLD ALMANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 497 (1984).
125. Rumhaus Hansen, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1178, [1979-81 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8754, at 9006-07.
126. Id. at 1179, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8754,
at 9007.
127. Id. at 1178-79, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8754, at 9008.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1182, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8754,
at 9009. In Aministrazionne Finanze dello Stato v. Essevi SpA and Carlo Salengo,
1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1413, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 8759, the Court addressed the Italian tax regime for certain potable spirits.
Imported cognac was taxed at a higher rate than was comparable domestic products
made of wine or marc. Id. at 1426, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MET. REP.
(CCH) 8759, at 9116. Tax benefits were denied to those products whose produc-
tion could not be inspected by Italian inspectors and so they were taxed at a higher
rate than those capable of being inspected in Italy. In striking down this tax scheme,
the Court said that to "make the grant of a tax exemption or the benefit of a reduced
rate of taxation conditional upon the possibility of inspecting production on the na-
tional territory constitutes . . . a condition which by definition can not be satisfied by
similar products from other Member States." Id. at 1434, [1979-81 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8759, at 9120.
130. Rumhaus Hansen, 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 1182, [1979-81 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8754, at 9009.
1984] EEC INTERNAL TAXATION
A more recent contribution to the jurisprudence of article
95 by the Hansen companies came in 1983.13 Hansen sought
certain tax advantages although its imported products did not
fulfill all the conditions imposed upon domestic products.1 3 2
The Court held that imported products must fulfill all condi-
tions and that these conditions may include the size, nature of
the raw materials, socio-economic group of the manufacturers,
and the requirement that the raw materials be entirely pro-
duced by the members of a cooperative.' 31
V. THE ARTICLE 169 CASES
A. The Alcohol Cases
The basis for the current construction of article 95134 is
found in four opinions handed down on February 27, 1980.'1 5
Of these, three were final decisions1 36 and one an interlocutory
order remanding the case for further findings of fact.' 3 7 This
latter case, Commission v. United Kingdom, was finally decided on
July 12, 1983.138
131. Hauptzollamt Flensburg v. Hansen GmbH & Co., 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. 1271, [1981-83 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8935.
132. Id. at 1283, [1981-83 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8935,
at 8908.
133. Hauptzollamt Flensburg v. Hansen GmbH & Co., 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J.
Rep. at 1284-85, [1981-83 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8935, at
8910.
134. For the provisions of article 95, see supra note 1.
135. Commission v. French Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 347, [1979-81
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8647; Commission v. Italian Republic,
1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 385, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 8648; Commission v. Kingdom of Denmark, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 447,
[1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8649; Commission v. United
Kingdom I, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 417, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8651.
136. Commission v. French Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 347, [1979-81
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8647; Commission v. Italian Republic,
1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 385, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 8648; Commission v. Kingdom of Denmark, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 447,
[1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8649.
137. Commission v. United Kingdom I, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 417, [1979-81
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8651.
138. Commission v. United Kingdom II, 1983 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 2265,
[1981-83 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8943.
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1. The Common Ground
The national governments of France, Italy, and Denmark
presented essentially the same definitional arguments in re-
sponse to the Commission's charges.1 3 9 They asked the Court
to define among spirits as a whole various categories of prod-
ucts on the basis of the raw materials used, their typical charac-
teristics or the consumer habits and preference observed in the
various member states.140 By contrast, the Commission's posi-
tion was that "all spirits, whatever the raw materials used for
their manufacture, have similar properties and in essence meet
the same needs of consumers."'14' It is interesting that the
Commission also argued that "spirits as finished products rep-
resent, from the point of view of consumers, a single general
market."'' 42 This argument reveals a fundamental definitional
difficulty common to both the Court and the Commission; they
appear to be unable to decide what weight should be given to
consumer preferences. 43  Do such preferences indicate the
presence of a properly functioning market or are they the re-
139. Commission v. French Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ctj. Rep. at 361, [1979-
81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8647, at 7662; Commission v. Ital-
ian Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 401, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8648, at 7678; Commission v. Kingdom of Denmark, 1980 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 464, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8649, at 7694.
140. Commission v. French Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 361, [1979-
81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8647, at 7662; Commission v. Ital-
ian Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 401, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8648, at 7678; Commission v. Kingdom of Denmark, 1980 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 464, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8649, at 7694.
141. Commission v. French Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 360, [1979-
81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8647, at 7662; Commission v. Ital-
ian Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 400, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8648, at 7678; Commission v. Kingdom of Denmark, 1980 E.
Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 463, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8649, at 7694.
142. Commission v. French Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 360, [1979-
81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8647, at 7662; Commission v. Ital-
ian Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 400, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8648, at 7678; Commission v. Kingdom of Denmark, 1980 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 463, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8649, at 7694.
143. See, e.g., Commission v. French Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 361,
[1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP, (CCH) 8647, at 7662; Commission
v. Italian Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 4501, [1979-81 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8648, at 7678; Commission v. Kingdom of Denmark,
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suit of distortion of the market through discriminatory fiscal
measures?
The Court chose a middle ground from among the criteria
suggested by the national governments and those suggested by
the Commission. 44 First, it concluded that spirits "form an
identifiable whole united by common characteristics," 41 in
that, "all contain, as a principal characteristic ingredient, alco-
hol suitable for human consumption at a relatively high degree
of concentration. '146 However, within this whole individual
products may have their own more or less pronounced charac-
teristics stemming from the raw materials used, the manufac-
turing process, or the flavorings added. What is more, there
are both "well defined products which are put to relatively spe-
cific uses [and] other products with less distinct characteristics
and wider uses." 147 Thus, a distinction is made between spirits
which owe their characteristics to their basic materials, such as
single malt scotch, and neutral spirits, such as vodka which owe
their individual characteristics to flavoring additives only. The
Court concluded that it was "[a] characteristic of the three
cases . . .that in each there are, in addition to well defined
1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 464, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MET. REP.
(CCH) 8649, at 7695; infra notes 159-63, 240-43 and accompanying text.
144. Commission v. French Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 361-62,
[1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8647, at 7662; Commission
v. Italian Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 401-02, [1979-81 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) $ 8648, at 7679; Commission v. Kingdom of Denmark,
1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 464-65, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MET. REP.
(CCH) 8649, at 7695.
145. Commission v. French Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 361, [1979-
81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MET. REP. (CCH) 8647, at 7662; Commission v. Ital-
ian Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 401, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8648, at 7679; Commission v. Kingdom of Denmark, 1980 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 464, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8649, at 7695.
146. Commission v. French Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 361, [1979-
81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) $ 8647, at 7662; Commission v. Ital-
ian Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 401, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8648, at 7679; Commission v. Kingdom of Denmark, 1980 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 464, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8649, at 7695.
147. Commission v. French Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 361-62,
[1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) $ 8647, at 7662; Commission
v. Italian Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 401-02, [1979-81 Transfer Binder]
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8648, at 7679; Commission v. Kingdom of Denmark,
1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 464-65, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MET. REP.
(CCH) $ 8649, at 7695.
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spirits, one or several products with a broad range of uses."'
1 48
The analysis of the entire tax structure and its effect upon all
the products is cast in terms of article 95(2) as a result of this
last finding. ' 49
2. The Individual Cases
a. Commission v. French Republic
In Commission v. French Republic,15 0 the Court addressed two
general taxes applied to spirits by France. The first, a
"purchase tax, ' 51 was applied to all alcoholic beverages. The
second, a "manufacturing tax," 152 was applied to geneva 53
and other spirits made from cereals, but not to those made
from wine or fruit.15
4
France employed a series of detailed arguments to show
that neither article 95(1) nor (2) applied to these categories of
products. First, it argued that consumers classified the prod-
ucts on the basis of the flavor, taste, aroma, and smell of the
liquor. 155 These consumer-based classifications of the prod-
ucts are such, France contended, that the products are
"neither similar nor even interchangeable or competing within
article 95."' 56 This basis was rejected by the Court as being
148. Commission v. French Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 362, [1979-
81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8647, at 7662; Commission v. Ital-
ian Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 402, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8648, at 7679; Commission v. Kingdom of Denmark, 1980 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 465, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8649, at 7695.
149. See infra notes 199-204 and accompanying text.
150. Commission v. French Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 347, [1979-81
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8647.
151. Id. at 364, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8647, at
7664.
152. Id.
153. Geneva is an alcoholic drink made in the Netherlands which is flavored
with juniper berries. WEBSTER'S NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 474 (1981).
154. Commission v. French Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 364-65,
[1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8647, at 7664-65.
155. Id. at 367, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8647, at
7665.
156. Commission v. French Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 367, [1979-
81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8647, at 7665-66. France relied, in
part, upon Hauptzollamt Bielefeld v. Offene Handelsgesellschaft in Firma H.C.
Konig, 1974 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 607, [1975 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP.
(CCH) 8275, where the Court validated a distinction between spirits with "flavor-
ing substances or distinctive properties of taste." Id. at 620, [1975 Transfer Binder]
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insufficiently objective to support a discriminatory scheme. 5 7
The second argument was that the tax scheme differenti-
ated aperitifs15 8 from digestives; t5 9 the former coincidentally
being cereal based and the latter wine or fruit based.' 6 Con-
sequently, because they were consumed at different times and
for different reasons, there is no, and could be no, competition
between the products in the two categories. This distinction
was denied by the Court on two bases. The first was that the
French tax code did not, in so many words, differentiate aperi-
tifs from digestives. 1 6  Of greater interest is the second rea-
son; that such a distinction did "not take into account [the]
many circumstances in which the products in question may be
consumed before, during or after meals or even completely
unrelated to such meals; it seems, moreover, that, according to
consumer preferences the same beverage may be used indis-
criminately as an 'aperitif' or 'digestive.' 162 This reasoning
by the Court is of interest because it contrasts with the Court's
frequent rejection of attempts by defendants to employ con-
sumer preference as a justification for their tax schemes. 63
COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8647, at 7111, and undenatured ethyl alcohol "devoid
of all flavoring substances." Id. In Commission v. French Republic, the Court distin-
guished Konig as making "a general distinction between spirits ...and pure ethyl
alcohol . . . . This judgment therefore provides no indications as to the scope of
any classifications within spirits as a whole." 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 368,
[1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8647, at 7666.
157. Commission v. French Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 369, [1979-
81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8647, at 7666-67.
158. Aperitifs are an alcoholic drink taken, before a meal, to stimulate the appe-
tite. A SUPPLEMENT TO THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 108 (1972).
159. Digestifs have the function of digesting food; engaging in or pertaining to
digestion. 3 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 351 (1933) "She will be obliged .. .to
flop down somewhere on the boulevard and sip her digestif." A SUPPLEMENT TO THE
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 799 (1972).
160. Commission v. French Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 367, [1979-
81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8647, at 7666.
161. Id. at 367-69, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8647, at 7666.
162. Id.
163. See, e.g., Commission v. United Kingdom I, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at
434, [1979 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8651, at 7725.
For the purpose of measuring the possible degree of substitution, it is im-
possible to restrict oneself to consumer habits in a Member State or in a
given region. In fact, those habits, which are essentially variable in time and
space, cannot be considered to be a fixed rule; the tax policy of a Member
State must not therefore crystallize given consumer habits so as to consoli-
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b. Commission v. Italian Republic
Commission v. Italian Republic16 4 is similar to Commission v.
French Republic.' 65 The tax scheme favored spirits distilled
from wine or marc 166 which are typically Italian products 167
over those obtained from cereals and sugar cane which were,
essentially, imported products. 168
The Italian government raised several arguments to show
that the products in question were so "absolutely different '" 69
as to be outside article 95(1). The products were treated as
different by the Community's Common Customs Tariff.1 70 In
addition, they were made from different basic raw materials1 7'
and by different manufacturing processes 72 so that the typical
characteristics of the products resulted from the combination
of those two factors. 173  Consumer preferences were also
called upon as a measure of distinction.1 74
Italy also argued that article 95(2) was inapplicable be-
date an advantage acquired by national industries concerned to comply with
them.
Id.
164. Commission v. Italian Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 385, [1979-81
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8648.
165. Commission v. French Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 347, [1979-81
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8647.
166. Marc is the residue that remains after the pressure of grapes or other fruits.
For instance, marc brandy is brandy distilled from marc. 6 OXFORD ENGLISH DIc-
TIONARY 153 (1933).
167. Commission v. Italian Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 404, [1979-
81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8648, at 7680.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 406, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8648, at
7681.
170. Id., [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8648, at 7682.
The Common Customs Tariff of the EEC is created and governed by articles 18
through 29 of the EEC Treaty. Article 19 provides that the common customs tariff
will be an arithmetical average of the existing rates of duty in certain specified areas.
However, there are also maximum rates for various categories of products specified
in paragraph 3 of article 19. These categories are detailed in Lists A to F, found in
Annex I to the EEC Treaty. See EEC Treaty, supra note 1, annex I.
171. Commission v. Italian Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 406, [1979-
81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8648, at 7681.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id., [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8648, at 7681-
82. The government argued that "[e]xperience shows that the choice of consumers
is always very specific, determined by taste, habits, and the true or presumed qualities
of the products, including their characteristics as regards health." Id.
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cause it "does not refer . . . to the difference between the tax-
ation imposed on domestic products and imported products
but to the protective nature of a given national tax system. "175
Italy felt that there was evidence of a nonprotective effect in
the fact that while consumption of spirits obtained from wine
and marc had grown only slightly, imports of whisky 1 76 into
Italy had undergone a massive increase.' 77 Unfortunately, the
Court did not address Italy's specific definitional arguments
under article 95(1).178 Instead, it found that because the two
groups of products formed "at least in certain circumstances,
an alternative choice for consumers" 179 article 95(2) was impli-
cated. Without mention of the evidence of a nonprotective ef-
fect advanced by Italy, the Court found that the system pro-
tected domestic products. 80
c. Commission v. Kingdom of Denmark
Commission v. Kingdom of Denmark' 8' is a particularly inter-
esting case. It considers the issue of how great a percentage of
a country's consumption of a product must be imported before
175. Id. at 406-07, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8648, at 7682.
176. "The Irish have kept the 'e' in the spelling of 'whiskey.' The Scots have
not. Although U.S. Federal regulations have adopted 'whisky' for the generic use of
the term, both spellings are acceptable in referring to U.S. products." Certain Spirits
From Ireland, 46 Fed. Reg. 38,780 n.3 (1981).
177. Commission v. Italian Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 406-07,
[1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8648, at 7682.
178. Commission v. Italian Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 407-08,
[1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8648, at 7682.
After considering all these factors, the Court takes the view that it is not
necessary for the purposes of solving this dispute to give a ruling on the
question of whether or not the spirituous beverages concerned are partly or
wholly similar products within the meaning of the first paragraph of Article
95, since it is impossible reasonably to contest that they are without excep-
tion in competition, at least partially, with the domestic products to which
the application refers and, moreover, the protective nature of the Italian tax
system within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 95 cannot be
denied.
Id.
179. Id. at 408, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8648, at
7682.
180. Id. at 409, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8648, at
7683.
1 1. 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 447, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8649.
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article 95 is implicated.182 Almost two-thirds of Denmark's an-
nual consumption of spirits was in the form of aquavit and was
taxed at a reduced rate. 8 3  However, of this favored two-
thirds, approximately ten percent was imported. 84 Con-
versely, over one-third of annual consumption was of "other
products," such as gin or whisky, and were taxed at a higher
rate. Domestic products comprised about one-third and im-
ports two-thirds of this less favored category.' 8 5
The Danish Government raised several arguments to show
that the aquavit and the other products were not similar prod-
ucts within the meaning of article 95(1). First, market surveys
showed that aquavit was "consumed principally at meals as an
accompaniment to typical dishses, so that it cannot be consid-
ered as a product equivalent to other spirits."'' 8 6  It also
pointed out that domestic and imported products both benefit-
ted and suffered from the system. 8 7 The Danish Government
argued that "[i]t thus appears that in the system of Danish law
there is no relationship between the fact that goods cross a
frontier and the application of a higher rate of tax."'18 8 The
last article 95(1) argument employed was that the current ex-
cise duty was nothing more than a translation of an ad
valorem' 89 tax previously in effect. 190  Because aquavit was
cheaper to make than, for instance, whisky, it was taxed at a
182. See infra notes 193-95 and accompanying text. Denmark applied. an excise
duty of Dkr. 167.50 per liter of pure alcohol to aquavit and schnapps and Dkr. 257.15
to "other products." In the reference year 1977, Denmark consumed 9,240,000 li-
ters of pure alcohol. Five million, seven hundred and eighty seven thousand benefit-
ted from the reduced rate; of which 5,728,000 was made in Denmark, 34,000 in West
Germany, and 25,000 in "third countries." Of 3,452,000 liters of pure alcohol con-
sumed in the form of "other products," 1,118,000 were domestic and 2,334,000 im-
ported. Commission v. Kingdom of Denmark, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 467-68,
[1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8649, at 7696-97.
183. Commission v. Kingdom of Denmark, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 468,
[1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8649, at 7697.
184. Id. at 469, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 8649, at
7697.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id., [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8649, at 7698.
188. Id. at 469-70, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8649, at 7698.
189. An ad valorem tax is one based on the value of the item subject to tax. DJ.
GAFFNEY, D.H. SKADDEN &J.E. WHEELER, PRINCIPLES OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
8-32 (1982). "Duties are either ad valorem or specific, the former when the duty is laid
in the form of a percentage on the value of the property, the latter where it is im-
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lower rate.' 9'
Concerning article 95(2), the Danish Government asserted
that aquavit's competition came from beer and not from other
spirits. 192 It argued that a finding of a "marked cross elastic-
ity"' 93 between products is required before article 95(2) could
be applied.'9 4 Otherwise, there would be no possibility of the
tax system providing a protective effect for domestic
products. 195
The Court rejected all of these arguments. The ad valorem
tax argument was found to be inapposite for two reasons.
First, the challenged tax was found to be an excise tax, not an
ad valorem tax.' 9 6 "[E]very tax system must be appraised in
light of Article 95 on its own merits and not in terms of a tax
system which preceeded it or which might if necessary be sub-
stituted for it.' 9 7 Second, many of the spirits subject to the
higher rate of tax, such as gin or vodka, were just as cheap to
make as aquavit.198
The Court found aquavit to be similar to some prod-
posed as a fixed sum on each article of a class without regard to its value." BLACK'S
LAw DICTIONARY 48 (5th ed. 1979).
190. Commission v. Kingdom of Denmark, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 470-
71, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8649, at 7698.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 470, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8649, at
7698.
193. A high cross elasticity of demand exists for "products regarded by consum-
ers as such close substitutes that a slight relative price change in one will induce
intolerable shifts of demand away from the other." 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTI-
TRUST LAw 370-71 (1978). "The outer boundaries of a product market are deter-
mined by the reasonable interchangeability of use or the cross-elasticity of demand
between the product itself and substitutes for it. However, within this broad market,
well-defined submarkets may exist which, in themselves, constitute product markets
for antitrust purposes . . . Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 325
(1962).
194. Commission v. Kingdom of Denmark, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 470,
[1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8649, at 7698. The Court
never addressed the Danish Government's argument that a showing of a marked
cross elasticity should be required for an article 95(2) analysis.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 471, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8649, at
7698.
197. Id. at 470-71, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8649, at 7698.
198. Id. at 471, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8649, at
7698.
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ucts;199 those which are "normally manufactured from neutral
alcohol and owe their characteristic flavor to added flavoring
extracts. '20 0 This finding brought the relative tax burdens on
these spirits within the analysis under article 95(1).201 In addi-
tion, aquavit is "in at least a partial substitution relationship
with an indeterminate number of other types of spirit."202
As a result of the Court's finding of a broad substitutional
relationship between aquavit and other spirits, an article 95(2)
analysis was applied to determine whether there was a protec-
tive effect given to aquavit by the challenged tax system. 20 3 It
is typical of the Alcohol Cases that although some products
were found to be similar within the meaning of article 95(1),
the only analysis applied by the Court was that used under arti-
cle 95(2).204
3. Commission v. United Kingdom
The proceedings which resulted in the Court's decision
against the United Kingdom 2 5 began almost exactly seven
years earlier with a letter from the Commission to the British
Government. 20 6 The Commission had taken the position that
the differences in the rates of excise tax on still light wine and
beer in the United Kingdom were contrary to article 95(2).2o7
The United Kingdom disputed the existence of a significant re-
199. Id., [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8649, at 7699.
200. Id.
201. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 31-34.
202. Commission v. Kingdom of Denmark, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 472,
[1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8649, at 7699.
203. [E]ven if doubts remain as to the question of the extent to which the
numerous alcoholic products classified by Danish legislation in the most
heavily taxed tax category must be considered as products similar to ac-
quavit within the meaning of the first paragraph of Article 95, it is impossi-
ble reasonably to contest that all those beverages are without exception in at
least partial competition with the product benefitted by the Danish
legislation.
Id. at 471-72, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8649, at 7699.
204. See supra text accompanying notes 139-49.
205. Commission v. United Kingdom II, 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2265,
[1981-83 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8943.
206. Id. at 2268, [1981-83 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8943,
at 8987.
207. Commission v. United Kingdom I, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 431,
[1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8651, at 7723.
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lationship between the beer and wine markets.2 ° s It also
doubted the Commission's findings concerning the level of
taxation on retail prices. 20 9 The Court addressed these con-
tentions serially in its decisions of February 27, 1980210 and
July 12, 1983.211
a. The Competition Issue: Commission v. United Kingdom I
It is essential to the finding of an article 95(2) violation
that the tax system have a protective effect over domestic prod-
ucts. 21 2 Unlike an examination under article 95(1), it is not
enough to show that there is a difference in the tax rates ap-
plied to the two products.2 1 3 However, the protection pro-
vided by the system need not be direct. 214 Thus, the United
Kingdom's argument that the Commission could not directly
and statistically show the protective effect was rejected by the
Court.21 5 The United Kingdom failed to prevail with the argu-
ment that "the tax system complained of did not prevent an
increase in imports of wine during the period under considera-
tion, and the changes in the rates of duty have had no percepti-
ble repercussions on the consumption figures. '21 6
The United Kingdom put forward four distinctions to
overcome the perceived general similarities between beer and
wine. 2 " The Government pointed to the differences in manu-
facturing processes, consumer habits, alcoholic content, and
208. Commission v. United Kingdom II, 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 2268,
[1981-83 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8943, at 8987.
209. Id.
210. Commission v. United Kingdom I, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 417, [1979-
81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8651.
211. Commission v. United Kingdom II, 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2265,
[1981-83 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8943.
212. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
213. Commission v. United Kingdom I, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 433,
[1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8651, at 7724.
214. Id. "Furthermore, a Member State shall not impose on the products of
other Member States any internal charges of such a nature as to afford indirect protec-
tion to other products." EEC Treaty, supra note 1, art. 95(2) (emphasis added).
215. Commission v. United Kingdom I, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 433,
[1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8651, at 7724-25.
216. Id. at 437, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8651, at
7726.
217. Id. at 434-35, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8651, at 7725.
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price structures.21 8 The Court rejected out of hand the con-
sumer preference criterion. 1 9 Of course, this argument has
almost consistently failed for defendants, although the Court
uses it for its own purposes.2 2 ° In addition, the manufacturing
processes of the two products are so different 22' that the Court
found them to be inapplicable for determining the existence of
a protective tax structure.2 22
The Court then found that the United Kingdom's tax sys-
tem was protective but, since it was unable to determine the
extent of the protective effect it remanded the case for further
findings of fact. 2 3 Although unable to clearly find any protec-
tive effect and unable to find any objective criterion of similar-
ity between beer and wine, it determined that the United King-
218. Id.
219. Id. at 434, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8651, at
7725.
220. Commission v. French Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 361, [1979-
81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8647, at 7662; Commission v. Ital-
ian Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 401, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) 8648, at 7678-79; Commission v. Kingdom of Denmark, 1980 E.
Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 464, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8649, at 7694-95.
221. Commission v. United Kingdom I, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 434-35,
[1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8651, at 7725.
Wine is an agricultural product which is the outcome of intensive farming
methods and is closely linked to the properties of the soil and climatic fac-
tors; for that reason its characteristics are extremely variable, whereas beer,
which is produced from raw materials less susceptible to risks of that nature,
is at the same time better suited to methods of industrial manufacture.
Id.
222. "The difference between the conditions of production leads, in the case of
both products, to price structures which are so extremely different that in spite of the
competitive relationship between the finished products it seems particularly difficult
to make comparisons from the tax point of view." Id. at 435, [1979-81 Transfer
Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8651, at 7725.
223. The Court considers that a comparison of the development of the
two tax systems in question shows a protective trend as regards imports of
wine in the United Kingdom. However, in view of the uncertainties remain-
ing both as to the characteristics of the competitive relationship between
wine and beer and as to the question of the appropriate tax ratio between
the two products from the point of view of the whole of the Community, the
Court considers that it is unable to give a ruling at this stage on the failure
to fulfil its obligations under the Treaty for which the United Kingdom is
criticized. It therefore requests the Commission and the United Kingdom to
resume examination of the question at issue in light of the foregoing
considerations.
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dom had failed to prove its case.224 This aspect of the case
reveals the predisposition of the Court against the national
governments in actions brought by the Commission.225
The Commission urged that the possible criteria of com-
parison to be employed were the tax applied per unit of alco-
holic content by volume, and consumer price in bulk. 226 The
British Government would have had the Court look at the inci-
dence of tax on the usual retail unit of measure.2 7 The Court
concluded that the "only factor which may enablean appropri-
ate and somewhat objective comparison ' 228 between the two
products "consists therefore in the appraisal of the incidence
of the tax burden in relation to the alcoholic strength of the
beverages in question.- 229
b. The Protective Effect and the Appropriate Tax Ratio:
Commission v. United Kingdom II
When the United Kingdom case 230 reached the Court a
second time, Italy proposed narrowing the definition of the in-
jured product to "the most popular and cheapest wines." 23'
The Court accepted this proposal as most closely defining the
products in competition.23 2 It is interesting that, although the
Court had already determined the existence of a protective
trend in Commission v. United Kingdom 1,233 it had not yet decided
224. Id.
225. See infra notes 230-33 and accompanying text.
226. Commission v. United Kingdom I, 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 435-36,
[1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8651, at 7726.
227. Id. at 436, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8651, at
7726. Thus, the fact that a pint of beer and a glass of wine carry roughly the same
amount of tax would mean that there is no discrimination.
228. Id. at 436-37, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT REP. (CCH)
8651, at 7726.
229. Id. at 436, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8651, at
7726.
230. Commission v. United Kingdom II, 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 2265,
[1981-873 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) $ 8943.
231. Id. at 2287, [1981-83 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) $ 8943,
at 9000. Italy had been in the case as an interested party at least from the time of the
1980 decision. Commission v. United Kingdom I, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 422,
[1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8651, at 7718.
232. Commission v. United Kingdom II, 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 2287,
[1981-83 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8943, at 9000.
233. 1980 E. COMM. CT. J. REP. at 438, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON
MKT. REP. (CCH) $ 8651, at 7727.
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which products to compare.234 It is difficult to understand how
the Court was able to know that there was actual or potential
competition between two products, as is required by the first
stage of an article 95(2) analysis, 235 if it had not yet defined one
of the products. The observer is left with the impression that
the Commission actually failed to prove the first element of its
case in Commission v. United Kingdom I.
The Commission, the United Kingdom, and Italy each
suggested an appropriate tax ratio.23 6 The Commission would
have applied a 1:1 ratio by alcoholic strength.23 7 For instance,
if wine has three times the alcohol content of beer, the appro-
priate tax ratio between the two would be 3:1. The United
Kingdom would have looked at the incidence of taxation on
the prices net of tax of the two products. 238 Thus, if, before
any taxes were added, a quart of wine cost two pounds and a
quart of beer cost one pound, the appropriate tax ratio would
2:1. Italy would have had the Court favor wine as an agricul-
tural product as opposed to beer, which is considered to be an
industrial product.239 Italy would alternatively have had the
Court apply a criterion based on volume of average consump-
tion.24 0 Experience has shown that the consumption ratio be-
tween beer and wine is roughly 1.5:1;241 thus the tax ratio
should also be 1.5: 1.242 The Court vaguely concluded that
234. Id.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 42-43.
236. See infra notes 237-42 and accompanying text.
237. Commission v. United Kingdom II, 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 2288,
[1981-83 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8943, at 9000. This ratio,
and the arguments of the parties concerning it, reveal an essential flaw in the entire
article 169 process. Since there was no consensus as to which products were in com-
petition, it was impossible to arrive at an accurate ratio. The alcohol content of Brit-
ish beers was relatively constant at 3.5-3.6%. However, the alcohol content of wine
varies greatly, from 9 to 12%. Thus, the possible ratios range from 1:2.5 to 1:3.42.
Id. at 2271, 2287, [1981-83 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8943, at
8989, 9000.
238. Commission v. United Kingdom I, 1983 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. at 2288,
[1981-83 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 1 8943, at 9000.
239. Id. at 2288-89, [1981-83 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8943, at 9000.
240. Id. at 2289, [1981-83 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8943,
at 9000.
241. Id., [1981-83 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8943, at 9000-
01.
242. Id.
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although none of the criteria for comparison [for] . . . de-
termining the tax ratio between the two products . . . is ca-
pable of yielding reliable results on its own, . . . each of the
three methods used, . . . assessment of the tax burden by
reference to the volume, the alcoholic strength and the
price of the products, can provide significant information
for the assessment of the contested tax system.243
The Court finally reached the conclusion that the effect of
the British tax system was to mark wine as a luxury, whereas in
the rest of the Common Market it was an item of ordinary con-
sumption. 24 4 There is, however, an inconsistency in this rea-
soning. The Court rejected a luxury status for wine which was
based upon long standing popular preferences.245 In part, this
holding was grounded on the rule that national popular prefer-
ences may not form a basis for discrimination.246 However, the
Court cites as support another popular preference, that of the
southern Europeans, which marks wine as an item of common
usage.247
B. Other Article 169 Cases
1. Commission v. Italian Republic
Commission v. Italian Republic248 is one of the rare article
95(1) cases. 249 The domestic and imported products were
used oil which, after processing, became functionally inter-
changeable with new oil.2 5 0 There was no doubt that at least
certain of the imported and domestic products were similar, or
243. Id., [1981-83 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8943, at 9001.
244. Id. at 2292, [1981-83 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8943,
at 9002.
245. See K.H. HAWKINS & C.L. PASS, THE BREWING INDUSTRY 16-17 (1979); A.
NIEDERBACHER, WINE IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 30 (1982).
246. See supra notes 159-63 and accompanying text.
247. A. NIEDERBACHER, WINE IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 30 (1982); C.J.
SMITH & R.Q. HANHAM, ALCOHOL ABUSE-GEOGRAPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 14-19
(1982).
248. 1980 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8631.
249. As noted, supra notes 206-11, the Court usually relies on the catch-all pro-
vision of article 95(2), even where it has made a finding of at least partial similarity of
the products in question.
250. Commission v. Italian Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 9, [1979-81
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8631, at 7466.
1984]
154 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 8:117
even identical. 25' However, the processing of the used oil was
very expensive 252 so that a tax exemption was granted in order
to encourage it.253 This exemption was granted on the condi-
tion that the processing be "carried out on the same premises as
those where the oils were first used ' 2 54 so that the process may
be supervised by the Italian Government.255
Italy attempted to use the exception developed in Hansen
& Balle 2 56 to justify the tax system, arguing that it was based
upon objective criteria and pursued the economic policy goals
of the Treaty.257 It defended the discrimination against im-
ported, regenerated oil on two grounds. First, it argued that
since there was no way to distinguish new oil from regenerated
oil, there had to be on site inspection in order to prevent peo-
ple from fraudulently claiming the tax advantage.25 8 Second,
the Italian Government argued that the high cost of regenera-
tion justified the distinction. 259 The Court decided that the
high cost of reprocessing was irrelevant,2 60 and responded by
putting the burden of proving eligibility for the exemption on
the importer.2 6'
2. Commission v. Italian Republic
Another recent case involving Italy and the Commis-
sion 62 shows the direct conflict between the broad prohibition
as applied in the Alcohol Cases and the article 95 exception as
251. Id.
252. Id. at 10, 14, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8631,
at 7467, 7469.
253. Id. at 14, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) $ 8631, at
7469.
254. Id. at 3, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MET. REP. (CCH) 8631, at
7463 (emphasis in original).
255. Id. at 10, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8631, at
7467.
256. 1978 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 1787, [1978-79 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) $ 8511.
257. Commission v. Italian Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 12, [1979-81
Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 9 8631, at 7468.
258. Id. at 14, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8631, at
7469.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Commission v. Italian Republic, 1983 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 601, [1981-83
Transfer Binder] COMMON MET. REP. (CCH) 8928.
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enunciated in Hansen & Balle,263 Vinal,264 and Chemial.2 65 Italy
taxed all spirits as nonessential luxuries.266 However, gin and
spirits which have a designation of origin or provenance regu-
lated or protected by specific measures in the territory where
they were produced were taxed at an even higher rate.267 The
difficulty with this scheme was that Italy had no rules gov-
erning origin or provenance of domestic spirits, so that only
imported spirits bore the extra charge.26 8 Italy relied on Vinal
and the other exception cases 269 and argued that luxury goods
were bought only by the economically better off so that the tax
was socially fair and furthered the policy objectives of the
Treaty.2 70 The Court rejected the use of the exception, saying
that the luxury goods criterion was insufficiently objective.27'
However, the right of the member states to tax luxury goods
more heavily than those of ordinary consumption was up-
held. 72 The difficulty here was that the definition of luxury
effectively precluded any imports from qualifying for the re-
duced rate of tax.273 Thus, the Italian tax scheme failed to
meet the element of the exception enunciated in Rumhaus Han-
sen GmbH & Co. v. Hauptzollamt Flensburg;2 74 that imports not be
precluded from possibly fulfilling the requirements of a tax
exemption. 75
The Italian Government also attempted to use a nonpro-
263. 1978 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 1787, [1978-79 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8511.
264. 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 77, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8724.
265. 1981 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 1, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8723.
266. Commission v. Italian Republic, 1983 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 617, [1981-
83 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8928, at 8825.
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 618-19, [1981-83 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8928, at 8826.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 620-21, [1981-83 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH)
8928, at 8827.
272. Id. at 621, [1981-83 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8928, at
8827.
273. Id.
274. 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 1165, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8754.
275. See supra text accompanying notes 128-30.
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tection argument, showing that sales of imported gin and spir-
its had far outstripped those of domestic products.276 The
Court rejected the nonprotection argument stating:
there are . . . characteristics common to all those spirits
which are sufficiently marked for it to be said that taxation
must not have the effect of protecting domestic products.
For that purpose it is necessary to take into consideration
the potential market of the products in question in the ab-
sence of protectionist measures and to ignore comparisons
of consumption and import figures.277
VI. THE ALCOHOL CASES AND THE EXCEPTION CASES
COMPARED
A. The Importance of the Alcohol Cases
The Alcohol Cases form the current basis for the jurispru-
dence of article 95.278 Their importance lies in the extent to
which the Court shows itself willing to expand the category of
"other products" in the context of article 95(2)279 and to find
evidence of indirect protection of these other products.28 ° In
all of these cases, a single category was created for all spirits,
within which no distinct subcategories could be defined.2 8'
This single market approach assures that the first part of the
dual analysis under article 95(2) is virtually automatically
met.282 The Court found a single market where there was at
least potential competition between the products in question
and where they could, at least in certain circumstances, form an
alternative choice for consumers. 213 Commission v. United King-
dom 11284 shows the extent to which the Court will extend this
potential competition approach in order to find a single mar-
ket. Ninety percent of beer was sold in pubs or working men's
276. Commission v. Italian Republic, 1983 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 620, [1981-
83 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8928, at 8826-27.
277. Id. at 621, [1981-83 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8928, at
8887.
278. A.J. EASSON, supra note 16, at 29-43.
279. See supra notes 139-49, 178-80, 199-204 and accompanying text.
280. See supra notes 175-77, 214-16, 223-25 and accompanying text.
281. See supra notes 140-42 and accompanying text.
282. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
283. See supra notes 39, 44-49, 179 and accompanying text.
284. 1983 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 2265, [1981-83 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) $ 8943.
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clubs.2 8 5 Sixty-five percent of wine sold was consumed in the
home, with the remaining thirty-five percent going to restau-
rants. 286 Actual competition between beer and wine was virtu-
ally nonexistent. In fact, the Court said the "present structure
of the British market precludes any meaningful comparison of
purchase prices either for typical wines inter se or between wine
and beer."
28 7
The Alcohol Cases also show the Court's readiness to find
evidence of protection of domestic products. The national
governments often presented evidence that the challenged tax
scheme had not had any protective effect.28 8 Thus, the second
step of the dual analysis under article 95(2) was not met.28 9
However, the Court rejected these contentions in every case,
either implicitly290 or explicitly.291
B. The Common Ground in the Article 177 Cases
The identifying feature of the article 177 cases is the crea-
tion of the exception to the single market approach which
characterizes the Alcohol Cases.292 However, in fashioning
this exception the Court has rarely attempted to distinguish
the article 169 cases. Instead, it has articulated the require-
ments for a valid exercise of the exception. The exception:
(1) must be based upon objective criteria, such as the nature of
the raw materials used or the production processes em-
ployed;293 (2) must promote economic policy objectives which
are compatible with the Treaty;294 (3) must not be such that
285. Id. at 2272, [1981-83 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8943,
at 8990.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. See supra notes 176-77, 216, 276 and accompanying text; In Commission v.
French Republic, 1980 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. at 368, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] Com-
MON MKT. REP. (CCH) 8647, at 7666, the French government argued that there had
not been any protective effect where "the consumption of cognac increased only
moderately in the period from 1963 to 1977 (from 33 361 hectolitres to 44 745
hectolitres), the consumption of whisky increased spectaculary during the same pe-
riod (from 34 104 hectolitres to 117 379 hectoliters)." Id.
289. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
290. See supra note 178 and accompanying text.
291. See supra notes 215, 277 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 84-92, 103-33 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 119-201 and accompanying text.
294. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
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imports could not, by reason of natural or legal elements, pos-
sibly fulfill its requirements; 295 and (4) may require that the
imports meet every one of its requirements in order to
qualify.296
CONCLUSION
The effective result of the Court's decisions construing ar-
ticle 95 since 1980 has been to establish this as a two-tiered
article. The dichotomy of results depending upon the proce-
dural route by which the case reached the Court leaves the ob-
server wondering just what is required by article 95. Are we to
follow the article 169 cases and assume that even potential
competition between products is sufficient to cast them as
"other products" within the meaning of 95(2)? Should the de-
fendant make an offer of empirical evidence of nonprotection,
as was done in each of the Alcohol Cases, or will this be re-
jected as being the result of distortions due to a history of il-
legal fiscal measures? What, then, of the exception as enunci-
ated in the article 95 cases reaching the Court via the article
177 route? Would the Court really accept as a party's argu-
ment the statement in Vinal and Chemial that where there is at
least the potential for the production of the imported product
in the member state in question there can be no protection?
The better course would be for the Court to take an op-
portunity to reconcile these two lines of cases. This could be
achieved by applying the exception in article 169 cases or, at
least, by presenting a detailed argument as to why the excep-
tion did not apply to those facts. A tentative move was made in
this direction in Commission v. Italian Republic 29 7 where the
Court rejected the application of the exception. In that case,
the Court decided that luxury status, and thus susceptibility to
higher taxes, may not be based solely upon the fact that a
product has a designation of origin or provenance. 298 This cri-
terion was held to be insufficiently objective to meet the first
requirement of the exception.299 Unfortunately, the Court ne-
295. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 262-77 and accompanying text.
297. 1983 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 601, [1981-83 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8928.
298. See supra notes 271-78 and accompanying text.
299. See supra note 271 and accompanying text.
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glected the opportunity to address the requirement enunciated
in the Rumhaus Hansen case 30 0 that the criterion for eligibility
for favorable tax treatment not be such that imports can not
possibly fulfill them. 30  An application of the exception, as it
emerges from an examination of the article 177 cases,302 would
insure that there is neither discrimination in favor of domestic
products nor stifling of fiscal innovations designed to assist
well defined groups of producers.
Ian G. Brownlee
300. 1981 E. Comm. Ct.J. Rep. 1165, [1979-81 Transfer Binder] COMMON MKT.
REP. (CCH) 8754.
301. See supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text.
302. See supra notes 293-96 and accompanying text.

